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Abstract. 
This paper examines the effect of various types of bank capital on the profitability and efficiency of 
conventional and Islamic banks. Our results show that higher quality forms of capital improve the 
profitability and efficiency for both systems although the results are stronger for conventional banks. 
The capital effect is more pronounced for large, too-big-to-fail, and highly capitalized banks. The 
results are robust across various subsamples, alternative profitability and efficiency measures, and 
different estimation techniques.  
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1. Introduction 
The severity of the 2007-2009 subprime crisis followed by the European sovereign debt crisis 
in 2010 and more recently Greece announcing its incapacity to pay its debt to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (June 2015) has sparked continuous overhauls in financial regulation 
throughout the financial system. It also encouraged the emergence and the development of 
alternative and/or complementary financial systems such as Islamic banking and finance1. Becoming 
systemically important in several countries (Song and Oosthuizem, 2014), Islamic banks are 
expected to reach $1.6 trillion in assets with an annual growth rate of 19.7% during the period 2013 
to 2018 (Ernst and Young, 2014). Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013) and Imam and Kpodar (2015) 
ascertain that Islamic banks can also play a key role in promoting financial inclusion2 and economic 
growth in Muslim countries.  
Islamic banking can be defined as “a type of finance that respects the principles of Sharia’a” 
(Gheeraert, 2014, pg. 4). The Arabic term Sharia’a means Islamic law and involves a series of 
instructions that govern not only the religious life of every Muslim but also all financial and 
economic aspects. These instructions include five principles that apply to Islamic banks (López-
Mejía et al., 2014; Jawadi et al., 2016a, b). First, the risk sharing between Islamic banks and their 
depositors – in particular investment account holders – provides more protection to the banks; 
second, Islamic banks are more conservative in their investments because they need to provide stable 
and competitive returns to their depositors; third, Islamic bank activities are asset-backed and thus 
directly associated with the real economy; fourth, investment account holders exercise more control 
on management since they share their risk with the bank; and finally, Islamic banks tend to hold 
important reserves with central banks because they lack short-term investment activities.   
These features of the Islamic banking system raise several regulatory concerns about the 
development of this industry. Masciandaro (2011), Song and Oosthuizem (2014), and López-Mejía 
et al. (2014) show that, although several countries are improving their legal, regulatory, and 
                                               
1 The World Bank Islamic Banking Database reports 394 financial institutions distributed in 57 countries across the 
globe. 
2 The 2014 Global Financial Development Report (GDFR) defines financial inclusion as the percentage of individuals 
and firms that have access to financial services. According to this concept, having rapid access to financial services 
is an important indicator that can be used to trace poverty; and it therefore works to ameliorate inequalities and 
improve prosperity and sustainable economic development between countries.   
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supervisory framework regarding Islamic banking activities, several challenges persist and require 
further investigation3.  
In this paper, we shed light on the effect of banking regulations – in particular the capital ratios 
implemented by the Basel Committee on Banking and Supervision (BCBS) – on the performance of 
both Islamic and conventional banks.4 More precisely, we analyze the impact of capital on the 
profitability and efficiency of Islamic and conventional banks. We follow Bitar et al. (2016) and 
Bitar et al. (2018) and examine the differences and similarities among various forms of capital using 
an unbalanced sample of 729 banks located in 33 countries over the period 1999-2013. We choose 
to evaluate the impact of capital ratios because of the tremendous change and rapid development in 
definitions and approaches used to compute capital ratios. This development not only reflects the 
importance of complying with regulatory guidelines to avoid financial distress but also the growing 
regulatory complexities faced by modern banking institutions.  
Our results provide important new insights. First, higher capital ratios have a positive and 
significant impact on the profitability and efficiency of Islamic and conventional banks, suggesting 
that well capitalized banks have a lower cost of funding, better monitoring and credit risk 
management, and make wiser lending decisions, which in turn lead to higher profitability and better 
efficiency. This is in line with the public interest and the moral hazard hypotheses about the 
importance of capital in improving bank performance and economic growth. Second, the impact of 
different forms of capital is stronger for conventional than for Islamic banks. Third, we document 
that our results are primarily driven by larger and too-big-to-fail banks. Fourth, highly capitalized 
banks, defined as banks whose capital ratios as disclosed by the banks in their annual report far 
exceed the minimum level required by the banking regulatory authorities, i.e. BCBS, exhibit 
significantly better performance. We conduct a series of robustness tests that show similar results 
when we break down our sample into banks in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and South East Asia (SEA), and before, during and 
                                               
3 At the 4th Islamic Banking and Finance Conference held in 2014, Thorsten Beck questioned how regulators should 
treat Sharia’a compliant finance and proposed two alternative solutions. First, regulators should try to fit Islamic 
banks into the existing regulatory framework subject to certain exceptions (e.g. Profit Loss Sharing (PLS) 
transactions). Second, they should create independent regulatory guidelines that deal specifically with Sharia’a 
compliant finance.  
4 The extant literature finds that cooperation is optimized with a small number of participants. Pattison (2006) shows 
that Basel I has over 100 adherents and explains why this is not an anomaly. 
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after the financial crisis. Finally, alternative performance and capital measures, additional 
macroeconomic and institutional indexes, a truncated regression, a first difference estimation, and 
a quantile regression approach confirm our earlier findings.  
 Our research contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, for the first time, we 
examine the impact of the Basel guidelines – in term of risk- and non-risk-based regulatory capital 
ratios – on the profitability and efficiency of commercial and Islamic banks. Second, our study is 
different because we use eight capital ratios including risk-based and non-risk-based capital 
measures in addition to traditional capital ratios to compare and examine whether the Basel Accords 
have a pronounced effect on the performance of commercial versus Islamic banks. We use risk and 
non-risk based capital ratios because of the renewed debate on the effectiveness of capital ratios. For 
instance, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013) and Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014) ask what kind of 
capital banks need to maintain and how to structure the capital. This corroborates with Haldane 
(2012), Dermine (2015) and Cathcart et al. (2015) who shed doubt on the ability of risk weighted 
assets in reflecting actual bank risk exposure, especially during the subprime crisis. This paper adds 
to the literature on the effectiveness of capital (i.e. the Basel risk-based capital ratios versus 
traditional non-risk based capital ratios) by examining Islamic banks. Finally, we utilize several 
regression techniques and combine parametric approaches (e.g. OLS regressions and truncated 
regressions) and non-parametric approaches (quantile regressions) to examine the robustness of our 
results.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 
describes the data set, provides definitions and sources for all variables, and discusses our 
methodology. Section 4 examines the impact of regulatory capital on bank profitability and 
efficiency. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Literature review  
2.1. Capital ratios and the performance of conventional banks 
The nature of the relationship between regulations and bank performance is not yet conclusive 
and often suggests mixed results. Several hypotheses have been put forward to explain this 
association. Ayadi et al. (2015) propose the “public interest” and “private interest” hypotheses to 
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explain the impact of regulations on bank performance. The public interest view suggests that 
governments and regulatory authorities have necessary information to better regulate the financial 
system especially with market failures. This increasing role in the economy promotes public interest 
and can lead to a better functioning of banks by nourishing competition and ameliorating effective 
governance and thus bank performance. Choretareas et al. (2012) explain that governments with 
powerful supervision can eventually improve bank efficiency by reducing corruption in bank lending 
activities. Their results are in line with those of Bitar et al. (2016) and Bitar et al. (2018) who 
examine the effect of capital on bank efficiency and profitability in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regions, 
respectively. In contrast, defenders of the private interest hypothesis argue that well-conceived 
regulation can distort bank efficiency by putting constraints on firms and channel resources to few 
special-interest groups at the expense of the broader public.  
Another hypothesis, which coincides with the public interest view, is the “moral hazard” 
hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that banks are required to hold more capital to impede moral 
hazard and thus agency conflicts between bank managers and shareholders (Fiordelisi et al., 2011; 
Barth et al., 2013).5  For instance, bank managers have an incentive to take excessive risk at the 
expense of bank shareholders and by exploiting flat-deposit insurance schemes. Accordingly, higher 
capital ratios play a key role in alleviating moral hazard, reducing cost and aligning the interests of 
bank managers and depositors, which results in better screening and more efficient lending 
activities. 6  Barth et al. (2013) investigate the relationship between banking regulations and 
efficiency. Their results suggest that banking regulation, supervision, and monitoring are important 
determinants of bank efficiency. For instance, capital stringency and equity to asset ratios are 
positively associated with bank efficiency. 
                                               
5 Moral hazard is generated from the agency conflicts between bank managers and shareholders where managers 
benefit from information asymmetry and take on excessive risk at the expense of shareholders.    
6 While this paper solely focuses on the impact of capital on bank performance, the literature provides abundant 
research on the association between capital, regulation and bank risk. For instance, Klomp and De Haan (2012) 
employ factors extracted using factor analysis and quantile regressions to show that capital regulations and 
supervisory control reduce moral hazard and thus bank asset risk, especially for high-risk banks. Similar results are 
also provided by Klomp and De Haan (2014) and Shehzad and De Haan (2015). We have tested the moral hazard 
hypothesis using three proxies of bank risk – the standard deviation of return on equity, the risk-adjusted return on 
assets, and the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans – to examine the impact of capital on bank risk. The results 
show that banks with higher capital ratios have lower earnings volatility, higher adjusted returns, and commensurate 
for risk by holding higher reserves for loan losses. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this point. 
We do not show the results for expositional brevity, but they are available from the authors upon request.  
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Examining an unbalanced panel of 5,227 bank observations in 22 European Union countries, 
Chortareasa et al. (2012) find that capital have a positive effect on bank efficiency and a negative 
effect on costs. Their results suggest that higher capitalization alleviates the agency problems 
between managers and shareholders. Hence, the latter will have greater incentives to monitor 
management performance and ensure that a given bank is efficient. This argument is supported by 
studies that examine the effect of capital on bank efficiency and profitability.  For instance, Lee and 
Hsieh (2013) find a positive association between the capital and profitability of commercial, 
cooperative, investment, and other banks in 42 Asian countries. Bitar et al. (2016) use a panel of 
178 banks from 17 MENA countries and compare the effect of risk- versus non-risk-based capital 
ratios on bank performance. Consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis,7 their findings indicate 
that capital in the form of common equity and Tier1 capital is more effective in improving bank 
performance compared to capital-like instruments or Tier2 capital. Bitar et al. (2018) obtain similar 
results when using a sample of 1,992 banks from OECD countries. Finally, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 
(2013) find a positive impact of capital on bank stock returns for a sample of developed countries, 
especially in the crisis period and for larger banks.  
While the literature provides important empirical support for the public interest and the moral 
hazard hypotheses, which suggest a positive association between capital regulation and bank 
performance, it also posits a negative impact. For instance, Berger and Di Patti (2006) develop the 
agency cost hypothesis, which suggests that high leverage or low capital ratios ameliorate bank 
efficiency. Some early banking studies also claim that capital ratios should be negatively associated 
with bank performance by arguing that higher capital ratios may alter the demands of investors who 
may thus accept lower rates of return. This is due to the fact that higher capital ratios alleviate banks’ 
risk taking and cause investors to accept lower returns on their investments (Park and Weber, 2006). 
In this context, Altunbas et al. (2007) report a negative relationship between bank efficiency and 
bank capital and suggest that inefficient European banks hold more capital than efficient ones. Their 
results are in line with those obtained by Goddard et al. (2013, pg. 15) who argue that “capitalized 
banks are less risky and therefore tend to generate lower returns”. 
                                               
7 Another possible explanation for the positive relationship between capital and efficiency is provided by Carvallo 
and Kasman (2005) and Ariff and Can (2008) who argue that efficient banks are more profitable and thus hold higher 
capital buffers as retained profits.  
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2.2. The capital and performance of Islamic banks 
While there is growing body of literature that compares the efficiency of Islamic and 
conventional banks, the question whether capital ameliorate or impede the efficiency of these 
institutions is still far from being answered.  
Pasiouras et al. (2009) argue that capital can influence the efficiency of the banking system 
for several reasons. First, by definition banks are financial intermediaries that transform their inputs 
(e.g. investment deposits in the case of Islamic banks) into outputs (i.e. mark-up transactions and 
profit loss sharing transactions in the case of Islamic banks). Therefore, capital stringency may 
influence the quantity and the quality of lending activities. Second, requiring banks to commensurate 
their capital ratios with the amount of risk taken may affect how managers allocate their bank’s asset 
portfolio and may alter the level of returns they are able to generate. Finally, capital ratios may shift 
banks’ decisions regarding the mix of deposits and equity employed to finance their activities. 
Rosman et al. (2014) examine the determinants of Islamic bank efficiency for the 2007/2010 period 
and find a positive association between capital and bank efficiency. The authors explain that Islamic 
banks hold higher capital buffers to protect against future losses. In addition, because more efficient 
banks are probably less leveraged (i.e. have more equity), they enjoy a lower cost of capital and thus 
are more efficient. 
On a theoretical level, Islamic banks can benefit from applying PLS principles to IAHs; 
therefore, they can take on more leverage and generate higher profits to satisfy shareholders at the 
expense of IAHs who bear any potential losses. Accordingly, bank managers and shareholders may 
continue to attract more IAHs and take on more leverage, which reduces the agency costs between 
both parties. This implicit agreement provides higher profits to the shareholders of Islamic banks 
while ameliorating the reputation, salary, and bonuses of Islamic bank managers. In other words, 
the investment accounts of Islamic banks may be used as leverage to maximize bank profits at the 
expense of bank IAHs and the banks’ capital position, thereby suggesting that higher leverage and 
thinner capital ratios ameliorate bank efficiency (Berger and Di Patti, 2006). 
However, on a practical level, Islamic banks cannot always channel losses to IAHs because 
eventually they will no longer invest with Islamic banks. IAHs could withdraw their money causing 
liquidity and solvency problems. One solution is that Islamic banks maintain profit smoothing 
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reserves;8 which will enable Islamic banks to channel retained earnings from these reserves to 
remunerate IAH accounts and avoid any possible withdrawals, especially when competing with 
conventional banks. Yet, Islamic banks need to adjust their equity base in case of severe losses or 
when their reserves are no longer capable of providing profits to IAHs (Bitar et al., 2017). As a 
result, they may decide to maintain higher capital ratios than conventional banks to avoid any 
possible solvency problems. This can also create incentives for bank shareholders to better control 
bank managers’ investment decisions. Higher capital ratios force bank owners to absorb losses using 
their own resources as a response to a “more skin in the game” policy instead of seeking a bailout 
through public funds (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013), thus supporting the moral hazard hypothesis 
cited above.  
Based on the results of these empirical studies, we formulate the following hypotheses: 
H.1: Increased capital ratios are positively associated with the profitability and efficiency of 
conventional banks.  
H.2: Increased capital ratios are positively associated with the profitability and efficiency of 
Islamic banks. 
Finally, the Basel III agreement could penalize Islamic banks because they lack experience 
and efficiency in liquidity management, and are restricted by Sharia’s principle in their use of debt 
and collateral instruments. Thus, we address the question whether higher forms of capital have the 
same or a different impact on Islamic and conventional banks by posing the following hypothesis:  
H.3: Increased capital ratios have a more pronounced effect on the profitability and the 
efficiency of conventional banks compared to Islamic banks. 
3. Sample, Methodology and Variables  
3.1. Sample 
We use Bankscope as a primary source of data for this study (Abedifar et al., 2013; Demirgüç-
Kunt et al., 2013; Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2014). For each bank in the sample, we retrieve 
annual data from 1999 to 2013. Our data is unbalanced and the number of conventional (Islamic) 
                                               
8 See section 2.1 and note 9. 
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banks varies between 377 (44) banks (at the lowest) in 1999 and 590 (139) banks in 2012 (at the 
highest). Macroeconomic data such as the GDP growth rate is obtained through the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators. A bank is excluded from the sample if it does not have at least 3 
continuous observations. In addition, we remove countries that have data for fewer than 4 banks.  
3.2. Regression model  
We examine the relation between capital ratios and bank profitability/efficiency by employing 
the following basic OLS regression models:9 
f(PROF1&2, EFF1&2)ijt = α + φ × bank_controlijt + β1 × IBDV × Capital_raijt 
                                                  + β2 ×  CBDV × Capital_raijt + Cc + YY  +  εi                (1) 
where i refers to bank i’s profitability ratios (PROF1 and PROF2) and efficiency scores (EFF1 and 
EFF2) in country j in year t. Capital_ra are the eight capital ratios, i.e. Tier 1 capital, Tier 2 capital, 
total capital, common equity, and tangible equity, as expressed in Section 3.3.10 Bank_control are 
bank-level control variables including bank size, the growth of total assets, bank loan engagement, 
fixed assets and non-operating income. IBDV is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 for 
Islamic banks and 0 for conventional banks while CBDV is a dummy variable that takes on a value 
of 1 for conventional banks and 0 for Islamic banks.  CC and Yy represent country and year fixed 
effect dummy variables.  CC and Yy are included to mitigate any effect of omitted variables related 
to each country and year specifications as explained by Demirgüç-Kunt and Anginer (2014).11  
                                               
9 Our regression methodology differs from Beck et al. (2013) and Abedifar et al. (2013) in two aspects: First, we examine 
the direct impact of capital ratios on both commercial (CBDV) and Islamic banks (IBDV). Second, we measure 
whether the results are similar or different for both systems.   
10 Except for the capital ratios, all correlation coefficients are below 0.4. Therefore, we run each model using only one 
measure of capital to avoid multicollinearity. The Pearson correlation matrix is available from the authors upon 
request.   
11 We follow Bitar et al. (2017) and cluster at the bank level instead of the country level for two reasons. First, some 
countries have a much larger number of observations than other countries in the sample. Second, we have thirty three 
countries. Therefore, clustering at the country level might create biased results.  
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3.3. Variable descriptions 
3.3.1. Measures of profitability and efficiency 
The main objective of this paper is to examine the impact of various definitions of capital on 
bank profitability and efficiency. We measure profitability using the ratio of net income to three 
year average assets (PROF1) and the ratio of operating profit to three year average assets (PROF2). 
These accounting ratios are used to control for any cross-bank differences in terms of performance 
(Mollah and Zaman, 2015). An increased value indicates a higher level of profitability and 
operational efficiency. We choose profitability ratios because they are both easy to find and to 
interpret, especially for comparison studies. However, profitability ratios cannot capture the 
complete picture of a bank’s performance (Bitar et al., 2016; 2018). In addition, there is no reason 
for preferring one specific ratio as a main measure of bank performance. While previous research 
typically compares the performance of Islamic and conventional banks using one approach, in this 
study, we combine financial ratios and efficiency scores. 
With regard to efficiency, the literature has mixed views regarding the use of technical 
efficiency (Barth et al., 2013; Johnes et al., 2014; Ayadi et al., 2016) versus cost and profit efficiency 
(Ariff and Can, 2008; Pasiouras et al., 2009; ) when examining the determinants of bank efficiency 
in response to capital, liquidity, profitability, and other regulatory and institutional determinants. 
Although we do not have any preference for a specific efficiency type, we employ technical 
efficiency instead of profit efficiency for two reasons. First, a measure based on input-cost and 
output-revenue would be more appropriate for studies that focus on conventional banks where the 
underlying objective is profit maximization in contrast to Islamic banks whose main objective is 
unlikely to be cost minimization or profit maximization (Johnes et al., 2014). Second, the literature 
is scarce when examining the determinants of bank performance using technical efficiency (Barth 
et al., 2013; Johnes et al., 2014). Therefore, our study adds to the Islamic banking literature by using 
technical efficiency along with various profitability measures. We estimate a model 12  that 
incorporates four inputs and three outputs.  The inputs are: deposits and short term funding 
(Chortareasa et al. 2012; Barth et al., 2013; Johnes et al., 2014), fixed assets (Rosman et al., 2014; 
Bitar et al., 2017), overhead as a proxy for general and administrative expenses and loan loss 
                                               
12 Detailed description of the methodology is available upon request.  
11 
 
provisions as a proxy of risk (Barth et al., 2013). The efficiency literature is divided about the 
incorporation of loan loss provisions13 versus equity to control for a bank’s risk exposure. On one 
hand, researchers such as Johnes et al. (2014) propose to use equity as an indicator of risk taking 
because data is less available for loan loss provision. On the other hand, Barth et al. (2013) point out 
that risk can be incorporated by including loan loss provisions in efficiency analyses. The outputs 
are: total loans (Chortareasa et al. 2012; Barth et al., 2013), other earning assets (Bitar et al., 2017), 
and other operating income. Barth et al. (2013) argue that an important reason behind the inclusion 
of other operating income is to avoid any penalization of banks that largely rely on non-traditional 
activities in their investment portfolio. 
3.3.2. Measures of capital and control variables 
We follow Bitar et al. (2016) and Bitar et al. (2018) and use several definitions of capital 
ratios. These measures are computed according to the Basel rule using risk-weighted assets (rwa) in 
the first step. Then, in a second step, we compute the same ratios but use total assets (ta) instead. 
The objective of such a comparison is to avoid any untruthful assessment related to the calculation 
of risk-weighted assets (Arnold et al., 2012; Cathcart et al., 2015; Dermine, 2015). The first vector 
employs three ratios14: Tier 1 (tier 1/rwa), Tier 2 (tier 2/rwa) and Tier 1 plus Tier 2 divided by risk-
weighted assets and off-balance sheet exposures (total capital/rwa). Tier 1 capital is the sum of 
shareholders’ funds and perpetual, non-cumulative preference shares. Tier 2 capital is the sum of 
hybrid capital, subordinated debt, loan loss reserves and valuation reserves.  Song and Oosthuizen 
(2014) and López-Majía et al. (2014) ascertain that Islamic banks have a very small Tier 2 capital 
ratio because they prohibit instruments such as subordinated debt (e.g. junior security and 
subordinated loans) that require interest payments. Thus, Basel III should not impact Islamic banks’ 
capital compared to conventional banks. Total capital, known as the capital adequacy ratio, contains 
Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, all scaled by risk weighted assets, and must be at least 8% under the Basel 
II rules. The second vector incorporates five ratios: Tier 1 to total assets (tier1/ta), Tier 2 to total 
assets (tier2/ta), Tier 1 plus Tier 2 divided by total assets (total capital/ta), common equity to assets 
                                               
13 We compute a basic gross efficiency score model in which we do not control for the risk in bank inputs in the first 
step (EFF1) and re-calculate our scores by introducing loan loss provisions to control for banking risk (EFF2).  
14 The Bankscope database lacks observations regarding Tier 1 capital (tier 1/rwa) and the total capital ratio (total 
capital/rwa). Therefore, whenever possible, we download the annual reports from the website of each Islamic bank to 
fill in any missing data. 
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(common equity/ta), and tangible equity to assets (tangible equity/ta). Bank common equity includes 
common shares and premium, retained earnings, reserves for general banking risks, and statutory 
reserves. Tangible common equity removes goodwill and any other intangible assets from its equity.  
We also employ a series of bank-level control variables to capture the differences in bank 
characteristics. We first include the natural logarithm of total assets to control for bank size (size). 
Second, we use the growth of total assets (growth assets) to control for the development in total bank 
assets in the current year compared with the previous year. For instance, Abedifar et al. (2013) use 
this ratio as a proxy for bank growth and development strategies. Third, we use the ratio of net loans 
to total assets (net loans/ta) because the literature shows that banks that possess a strong loan 
portfolio are less exposed to risk than other banks that prefer to invest in derivatives, other types of 
securities, and other non-traditional activities. Fourth, we employ the ratio of fixed assets to assets 
(fixed assets/ta) to control for the bank’s financing activities. According to Beck et al. (2013) this 
ratio accounts for the opportunity cost that arises from incorporating non-earning assets in the banks’ 
balance sheet. Finally, we control for activities that are not related to bank core operations using 
non-operating income scaled by total assets. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level 
to mitigate the effect of outliers.  
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics  
Tables 1.A and 1.B present descriptive statistics for all variables. We find that Islamic banks 
are more profitable and more efficient than conventional banks. For example, the PROF1 average is 
1.21% for Islamic banks and 1.12% for conventional banks. Similarly, the EFF1 average is 52.36% 
for the former and 49.06% for the latter. We obtain the same results for PROF2, EFF2, and 
alternative performance measures. T-tests show that Islamic banks are significantly more efficient 
than conventional banks in terms of PROF2, EFF1, and EFF2. In addition, we find that Islamic 
banks are more capitalized than conventional counterparts. Risk- and non-risk-based capital ratios 
(i.e. Tier 1/rwa, Tier 2/rwa, Total capital/rwa as risk-based ratios and Tier 1/ta, Tier 2/ta and Total 
capital/ta as non-risk-based ratios) in addition to traditional capital ratios (i.e. common equity/ta and 
tangible equity/ta) confirm our results. However, we show that capital-like or Tier 2 ratios are higher 
for conventional banks than for Islamic ones, supporting Song and Oosthuizen (2014) and López-
13 
 
Majía et al. (2014) who observe a rare use of Tier 2 by Islamic banks. We also note that the number 
of observations varies significantly between risk-based measures and non-risk based measures. For 
instance, the ratio of Tier1 capital to risk weighted assets (Tier 1/rwa) has 3,692 observations with 
an average of 24.31% for Islamic banks and 16.81% for conventional banks (well above the 
minimum 4% capital requirement proposed by the BCBS). Non-risk based capital measures have 
almost three times as many observations. For instance, the ratio of common equity to total assets has 
a total of 8,398 observations with an average value of 20.96% for Islamic banks and 13.62% for 
conventional banks. Table 1.B breaks down the number of observations for the three risk-based 
capital ratios and traditional capital ratios over time. The number of missing observations between 
the risk-based capital variables and the common equity to assets ratio stands out. In addition, we can 
observe that the disclosure of capital ratios increases over time, which reflects bank engagement in 
adopting the BCBS requirements of disclosing capital information.  
INSERT TABLE [1] AROUND HERE 
4.2. The association between capital, bank profitability, and efficiency: An overview  
To consider the effect of capital on bank profitability and efficiency, we regress our 
profitability and productive efficiency ratios on a vector of eight capital ratios that include Basel 
risk- and non-risk based capital ratios in addition to traditional capital measures, while controlling 
for bank level, country, and year fixed effects. Following Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013) and Anginer 
and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014), we use the OLS regression model in Eq. (1). The results are presented 
in Table (2) for the profitability models and the efficiency models. 15 
The findings16 suggest that risk based and non-risk based capital ratios have a positive impact 
on the performance of both Islamic and conventional banks. However, we find that Tier 2 ratios 
have a positive but marginal effect on the profitability of conventional banks while they have no 
significant effect on the profitability and efficiency of Islamic banks. Finally, traditional capital 
indicators appear to have a strong positive association with bank profitability and efficiency for both 
banking systems.   
                                               
15 We also run regressions by separating Islamic banks from conventional banks and obtain same results. The results are 
available upon request.  
16 We do not report control variables in Table (2) and Table (3) to save space. Tables with all control variables and 
explanations are available upon request. 
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The reason for choosing several capital ratios and examining their impact on bank performance 
is that the choice of variables might influence the results (Bitar et al., 2016; Bitar et al., 2018). For 
instance, Haldane (2012) finds that simple non-risk based capital measures outperform risk based 
capital measures when studying the association between capital and bank failure and calls for 
simplifying banking regulation. This is also supported by Blum (2008) and Dermine (2015) who 
suggest a risk independent leverage ratio as a complementary tool to capital ratios based on risk-
weighted-assets. Both studies argue that the Basel risk weighting approach is ineffective in dealing 
with complex financial products such as CDS contracts that allow banks to extend their leverage 
without any limits. Finally, Arnold et al. (2012) argue that regulators need to distinguish between 
good quality capital (e.g. the common equity Tier 1 capital ratio) and capital-like ratios (or debt 
ratios; e.g. the Tier 2 capital ratio). They explain that more capital is good but it is important to 
understand that some capital is better than other capital. Our results suggest that good quality capital 
such as Tier1, common equity, and tangible equity have a better effect on the profitability and 
efficiency of Islamic and conventional banks than capital-like ratios such as Tier 2, thus confirming 
Arnold et al. (2012)’s findings. The results confirm Anginer et al.’s (2014) and Demirgüç-Kunt et 
al.’s (2013) concerns about the composition of Tier 2 capital and how it may be the reason behind 
the ineffectiveness of capital ratios in absorbing losses during the subprime crisis. Tier 2 capital 
includes hybrid capital instruments and subordinated debt and is thus less reliable than tier 1 capital. 
Our findings are in line with the new BCBS guidelines, i.e. Basel III, that require banks to increase 
their Tier 1 capital ratio to 6% and maintain a constant Tier 2 capital ratio of only 2%.  
Except for the Tier 2 ratios, all capital ratios confirm the public interest and moral hazard 
hypotheses, suggesting a positive association between capital and bank profitability/efficiency 
(Barth et al., 2013; Bitar et al., 2016; Bitar et al., 2018) for both Islamic and conventional banks, 
thus supporting hypotheses H.1 and H.2. Our results can be interpreted as follows. First, higher 
capital ratios decrease moral hazard in shareholders’ behavior as a response to a more skin in the 
game policy. It also diminishes bank managers’ appetite to engage in riskier activities. Second, a 
strong capital structure provides strength to banks, especially in developing countries. Well 
capitalized banks better withstand financial crisis, political instability, and severe economic 
conditions. These banks have lower concerns of going bankrupt and a lower funding cost than less 
capitalized banks that have higher leverage, riskier portfolios and higher borrowing costs. Third, 
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better regulation and supervision in the form of higher capital measures create incentives for banks 
to have better risk management and wiser decisions regarding lending and investment decisions and 
this does not exclude Islamic banks. Ultimately, these results can be reflected in allocating resources 
in a more efficient way, resulting in higher profitability and better bank performance.  
INSERT TABLE [2] AROUND HERE 
The findings also suggest that the impact of capital ratios is more pronounced for conventional 
than Islamic banks, thus supporting hypothesis H.3 although the F-test (Wald) for the degree of 
significance between regulatory coefficients of Islamic and conventional banks is not always 
significant, especially for the efficiency models.  These findings can be explained by several factors. 
First, depending on the countries in which they are located, Islamic banks either use BCBS as a 
reference to compute their capital ratios, or employ IFSB principles and adapt BCBS to their specific 
business model. Applying BCBS requirements for Islamic banks without considering their 
particularities may reduce the intended effect of capital ratios. Second, Islamic banks lack the 
experience and expertise regarding the standardization and harmonization of their regulatory 
requirements and supervisory authorities. Finally, Islamic banks are constrained by the Islamic law 
and thus cannot benefit from several debt and collateral instruments – incorporated in Tier 2 – 
compared to their conventional peers, which can be translated into a negative or non-significant 
impact on their performance.       
4.3. The role of bank size and too-big-to-fail banks 
To test the impact of capital ratios on the performance of larger banks and too big to fail banks, 
we include two variables by interacting bank size (size) – using the logarithm of total assets – and a 
too big to fail dummy (tbtf) – a dummy variable that equals 1 if size > upper quantile (Q75) and 0 
otherwise – with our capital ratios. To do this, we use the following regression equation: 
f(PROF1&2, EFF1&2)ijt = α + φ × bank_controlijt +  β2 ×  IBDV × Capital_raijt × (size/tbtf) 
                                                  + β2 ×  CBDV × Capital_raijt × (size/tbtf) +  Cc + YY  +  εi            (2) 
Table (3) Panel A reports the results for bank size while Panel B provides the results for too 
big to fail banks. The findings suggest that larger banks with higher capital ratios are more profitable 
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and more efficient (Panel A). The results persist when employing the too big to fail dummy for 
efficiency models (Panel B) but they are less effective for profitability models especially for Islamic 
banks. Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014) argue that larger banks exist in several markets in 
different countries, engage in non-traditional activities, and tend to have higher profits and thus 
higher retained earnings in their capital buffer. Accordingly, capital ratios should be positively 
associated with bank profitability and efficiency. In addition, holding higher capital ratios 
encourages bank managers to adopt better banking and risk management practices (Bitar et al., 
2018), which translate into a lower risk of financial crises, better supervision and monitoring (Barth 
et al., 2013), and thus higher efficiency scores. However, bigger banks might be more sensitive to 
capital because they will invest less in riskier portfolios and require more supervision and 
monitoring. The same rationale applies for Islamic banks. As they become bigger, challenges in term 
of risk management, investment choices, and Sharia’a compliance will become stronger. 
Accordingly, holding higher capital buffers can become a barrier against investments rather than an 
insurance policy, which could explain the reduced impact on the profitability ratios.         
INSERT TABLE [3] AROUND HERE 
4.4. Highly capitalized banks  
To further assess the motives behind holding higher capital ratios and their impact on bank 
performance, we focus on excessively capitalized banks. Berger et al. (2008) provides three 
arguments for holding excess capital. First, higher capital ratios reflect higher retained earnings as 
a precautionary policy against any future equity shortages.17 Second, banks are more sensitive to 
factors such a as earnings volatility, depositors, charter values and regulatory policies (e.g. too-big-
to-fail) which create incentives for bank managers to adapt their capital ratios according to these 
factors. Finally, banks that plan to have future mergers prefer to maintain higher capital buffers to 
ensure regulators’ acceptance. As for the impact on bank performance, the literature shows that 
higher ratios ameliorate bank profitability and efficiency because they create an incentive for bank 
managers to avoid risk, ameliorate monitoring and supervision of lending activities, lower bank costs 
                                               
17 Barajas et al. (2015) argue that there are four factors in corporate finance that make raising equity costly: insufficient 
information about bank loan portfolios,, favorable conditions regarding the tax treatment of dividends, the existence 
of a too-big-to-fail policy, and, the use of a deposit insurance scheme. According to the authors, these factors put 
constraints on Modigliani and Miller’s (for more details, see Chami et al. (2001)) theorem that posits that bank capital 
structure is irrelevant to its value and thus financing bank operations should not be constrained by a bank’s equity. 
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(e.g. by raising capital in stress situations) and thus improve bank performance. We define excess 
regulatory capital as the value that exceeds the minimum capital requirements explicitly determined 
by the BCBS. The minimum level is given as a 4% Tier 1 (tier 1/rwa) and an 8% capital adequacy 
ratio (total capital/rwa) for adequately capitalized banks and a 6% Tier 1 and a 10% capital adequacy 
ratio for well capitalized banks. Table (4) reports the results following three distinguished definitions 
of excess capital.18 Panel A and Panel B define excess capital as the difference between the actual 
capital ratios  disclosed by  banks in their annual report and the minimum level required by  banking 
regulatory authorities (i.e. the BCBS). Panel A employs a minimum value of 4% for Tier 1 and 8% 
for capital adequacy using the international BCBS standards while Panel B employs a minimum 
value of 6% for Tier 1 and 10% for capital adequacy for well capitalized banks.  Finally, Panel C 
defines excess capital using a dummy that equals 1 when a capital ratio exceeds its upper quantile 
(Q75) and 0 otherwise. Our findings show very consistent results. Excess risk-based capital ratios 
as defined in Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C are positively associated with banks’ profitability and 
efficiency although the results are less significant for Islamic banks, in particular in the profitability 
models. We conclude that adequately capitalized banks, well capitalized banks, and highly 
capitalized banks are more likely to have a positive effect on bank performance which reflects good 
monitoring and supervision and good risk management, thus supporting the BCBS argument about 
capital ratios as a good determinant of bank performance. The findings also confirm hypotheses H1, 
H2, and H3 although the F-test (Wald) for the degree of significance between regulatory coefficients 
of Islamic and conventional banks is not always significant.   
INSERT TABLE [4] AROUND HERE 
4.5. Robustness tests19: Endogeneity concerns and other estimation techniques 
Despite the differences in views regarding the importance of using lagged (e.g. Demirgüç-
Kunt et al., 2013; Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2014) versus non-lagged (Chortareasa et al., 2012; 
Barth et al. 2013) independent variables when examining the impact of banking regulation, we 
                                               
18 We only present results for the Basel capital ratios. In unreported regressions, we perform similar analyses for other 
capital ratios and obtain very consistent results. These results are available upon request. 
19  Additional information and tests on the effects of Basel versus IFSB guidelines, institutional environment, and 
subsamples on bank performance are available on the following website: https://business.missouri.edu/people-
directory/kuntara-pukthuanthong.  
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hypothesize that regulatory ratios might take more than one year to show any pronounced effect. In 
addition, a one-year lag in the independent variables reduces any concerns about endogeneity.20 
Therefore, we lag our capital ratios by one year to examine the robustness of our results. Our results, 
reported in Table (5), are very similar to the results we obtain with our main and alternative 
performance measures, thus confirming our earlier findings. 
INSERT TABLE [5] AROUND HERE 
To further examine the interaction between capital ratios and the performance of conventional 
and Islamic banks, we extend Eq. (1) and perform truncated regressions in a first step, a first 
difference estimation in a second step, and conditional quantile regressions in as second step. Barth 
et al. (2013) explain that efficiency scores are truncated below zero and above one hundred. Thus, 
the error term has double truncation. According to Simar and Wilson (2007), applying a truncated 
regression permits valid inferences. We use standard maximum likelihood estimation with 
heteroscedasticity robust standards errors clustered by banks to allow for residuals to be correlated 
across time and within banks. Our results, reported in Table (6), Panel A, are more pronounced than 
our earlier findings.21 
Barth et al. (2013) suggest that it would be interesting to explore how banks’ efficiency reacts 
to changes in regulatory reforms. Another reason for studying changes in capital ratios is that Islamic 
banks are often more capitalized than their conventional peers. Therefore, it is important to study 
the year-to-year changes for different capital ratios in addition to the effect of their absolute values 
on profitability and efficiency. To accomplish this, we employ a first-difference estimation with 
year-to-year changes for all dependent and independent variables. We lose several bank-year 
observations because of the first-differentiation estimation. As a result, the final sample contains 
observations for fourteen out of fifteen years. The findings are presented in Table (6), Panel B, and 
show that an increase in banks’ capital ratios have a positive and significant effect on the profitability 
and the efficiency changes for both bank types although the effect is more pronounced for 
                                               
20 We also apply an Instrumental Variables (IV) approach using 2-Stage Least Squares regressions (2SLS) on the entire 
sample (without separating it into Islamic and conventional banks). As instruments, we employ Overall Economic 
Freedom and the World Governance Indexes in the profitability and efficiency models, respectively. The results 
provide additional support for our earlier findings and suggest that they are not driven by endogeneity. 
21 In other robustness tests, we use two alternative profitability and efficiency measures in a first step and four alternative 
capital measures in a second step. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the results presented here 
and are available upon request. 
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conventional than for Islamic banks. The results suggest that changes in bank capital for regulatory 
reasons (e.g., different capital guidelines, changes in the institutional environment) have a direct 
positive effect on bank profitability and efficiency. 
INSERT TABLE [6] AROUND HERE 
Finally, we employ a conditional quantile regression22 because it allows for heterogeneous solutions 
to our capital proxies by conditioning on bank profitability and efficiency (less profitable/less 
efficient vs. highly profitable/highly efficient). 
Figures 1 and 2 plot the estimates for our quantile and least squares regressions for all capital 
ratios specified in the profitability (PROF1) and efficiency (EFF1) models, respectively.23 For each 
covariate, we plot the quantile regression estimates for the capital ratios as a function of quantiles 
ranging from 0.05 to 0.95 shown as a solid curve. The shaded grey band illustrates the conventional 
90 percent confidence interval, estimated using a bootstrapping technique. The long dashed line 
represents the OLS estimate and the two dotted lines characterize the confidence band.  
Risk- and non-risk based capital measures in addition to traditional capital ratios show that 
banks with higher capital ratios have higher profitability and efficiency. The findings are more 
important in magnitude as both performance measures move up towards the upper quantile. Our 
results can be explained by the fact that more profitable banks tend to hold higher capital buffers as 
retained earnings (Ariff and Can, 2008). We also note that capital-like ratios (Tier 2 ratios) derived 
from both risk and non-risk-based measures do not show the same pattern compared to other capital 
ratios; rather they show a destabilizing effect. Our results confirm the findings of Arnold et al. 
(2012), Bitar et al., (2016), and Bitar et al. (2018), who suggest that the use of some capital such as 
Tier 1 or common equity is better than other capital such as Tier 2 capital.  
INSERT FIGURES [1 & 2] AROUND HERE 
                                               
22  Quantile regression results are also robust for outliers and distributions with heavy tails. In addition, quantile 
regressions avoid the restrictive assumption that the error terms are identically distributed at all points of the 
conditional distribution.  
23 The quantile regression results confirm our earlier findings. We do not report the respective tables to save space; 
however, they are available from the authors upon request.   
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5. Conclusion 
This is the first study that explores the relation between BCBS capital guidelines and the 
profitability and efficiency of Islamic and conventional banks. In contrast to most studies that use 
traditional capital ratios, we employ various forms of capital ratios in addition to several profitability 
and efficiency measures. Our results suggest that: First, various forms of capital positively affect the 
profitability and efficiency of both Islamic banks and conventional banks, thus supporting the public 
interest and the moral hazard hypotheses. Second, capital ratios have a more pronounced impact on 
the operating performance of conventional banks than for Islamic banks. Third, our results appear 
to be affected by larger banks, too-big to-fail banks, and highly capitalized banks. Finally, the 
findings are robust to alternative performance and capital measures, additional control variables, and 
other estimation techniques.    
There are several limitations to our study but three are worth of note. First, there is no prior 
theoretical or empirical literature that compares the impact of banking regulations in terms of capital 
ratios on the profitability and efficiency of Islamic banks. While the lack of prior research work 
makes the contribution of our study unique, it also means that there is no widely accepted standard 
to estimate the impact of BCBS/IFSB capital ratios on this type of institutions. Second, our sample 
lacks bank level observations especially for risk-based capital ratios such as Tier 1/rwa and total 
capital/rwa for both Islamic and conventional banks. Third, we are unable to use market indicators 
such as stock returns because of a lack of bank observations. Once more data becomes available, 
future studies should be able to examine the relations between capital and bank performance using 
reasonably large samples to conduct regressions.    
Our work is important given the renewed focus on the regulation of conventional banks. It 
also poses several questions about the regulatory framework for Islamic banks. Indeed, future work 
should determine an appropriate regulatory framework for Islamic banks. Islamic regulatory 
organizations should use Islamic financial principles and concepts to create their own set of ratios 
rather than imitating the Basel framework. However, we do not call upon Islamic banks to escape 
the BCBS framework, rather we believe that the existence of IFSB capital guidelines is welcomed 
and can serve as a cornerstone for more detailed capital guidelines that not only consider the 
particularities but also the heterogeneity of Islamic banks across countries.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1.A  
Descriptive statistics 
Label N Mean Median Std Dev. Min. Max. Islamic 
banks (IBs) 
Mean 
Conventional 
banks (CBs) 
Mean 
Two-sample 
 t-test  
(CB-IB) 
Performance variables  
PROF 1 8322 1.14 1.11 2.48 -17.15 16.67 1.21 1.12 -0.77 
PROF 2 6717 1.55 1.41 2.52 -9.05 17.46 1.88 1.48 -3.64*** 
EFF 1 6635 49.56 44.56 25.48 0 100 52.36 49.06 -3.57*** 
EFF 2 5200 63.11 59.92 24.01 0 100 67 62.52 -4.4*** 
Alternative performance variables 
NIMP 8195 3.99 3.39 3.24 -6.27 28.23 4.27 3.94 -2.5** 
FEEAAP 6669 1.16 0.73 1.42 -0.23 13.32 1.26 1.14 -1.91* 
EFF3 6635 56.73 52.12 26 0 100 75.3 53.38 -25.0*** 
EFF4 5200 69.38 67.36 23.17 0 100 86.37 66.84 -23.43*** 
Main variables   
Tier 1/rwa 3692 18.34 14.58 12.03 7.51 79.8 24.31 16.81 -10.55*** 
Tier 2/rwa 3634 2.06 1.38 1.96 0 8.7 1.35 2.24 13.11*** 
Total capital/rwa 4988 21.23 19.97 12.61 9.43 86 26.23 20.2 -8.53*** 
Tier 1/ta 3606 12.02 9.47 9.64 3.22 73.86 17.64 10.88 -9.03*** 
Tier 2/ta 3530 1.44 0.89 1.69 0 11.26 0.95 1.53 10.2*** 
Total capital/ta 3818 13.33 10.83 9.66 3.57 75.57 18.54 12.34 -8.24*** 
Common equity/ta 8398 14.82 10.3 14.45 2.64 82.42 20.96 13.62 -12.44*** 
Tangible equity/ta 8399 14.96 10.53 14.53 2.81 84.4 21.34 13.71 -12.67*** 
Control variables          
Size 8399 13.95 13.85 2.02 9.69 19.89 13.74 13.99 4.64*** 
Growth assets 7647 18.26 12.9 30.37 -44.71 220.18 27.04 16.59 -9.44*** 
Net loans/ta 8280 48.69 50.83 22.95 0.03 98.85 47.78 48.86 1.48*** 
Fixed assets/ta 8139 1.99 1.22 2.44 0.002 17.23 2.75 1.85 -9.9*** 
Non-operating income 8193 63.07 66.8 23.37 -21.21 97.85 58.34 64.00 6.63*** 
 
 
 
Table 1.B  
Number of banks and years covered in the sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Tier 1/rwa Tier 2/rwa Total capital/rwa Common equity/ta 
Year # CBs # IBs # CBs # IBs # CBs # IBs # CBs # IBs 
1999 45 2 43 2 139 11 377 44 
2000 50 3 48 3 154 12 394 48 
2001 57 4 57 4 148 13 359 47 
2002 77 7 76 7 171 18 371 57 
2003 101 16 101 15 185 22 378 60 
2004 137 24 136 23 210 26 421 60 
2005 168 30 165 28 246 31 469 79 
2006 216 49 213 47 283 53 485 90 
2007 259 73 256 71 321 74 499 108 
2008 282 85 279 84 331 94 508 123 
2009 310 95 306 95 358 100 522 131 
2010 310 95 304 92 368 100 542 133 
2011 302 93 298 91 398 105 569 139 
2012 306 88 302 87 420 101 590 139 
2013 319 89 313 88 398 98 540 116 
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Table 2 
The effect of capital on bank profitability and efficiency: Islamic vs. conventional banks 
Variables PROF1 PROF2 EFF1 EFF2 
 Coef.  N F-test  R2 Coef. N F-test R2 Coef. N F-test R2 Coef. N F-test R2 
Tier 1/rwaxIBDV 
 
0.027* 
(0.015) 
3261 7.69*** 0.227 0.043*** 
(0.015) 
2685 2.47 0.274 0.4*** 
(0.074) 
2456 0.182 0.632 0.518*** 
(0.098) 
2149 5.57** 0.562 
Tier 1/rwaxCBDV 
 
0.057*** 
(0.01) 
   0.06*** 
(0.011) 
   0.509*** 
(0.081) 
   0.734*** 
(0.082) 
   
Tier 2/rwaxIBDV 
 
-0.035 
(0.076) 
3213 0.19 0.186 0.018 
(0.087) 
2640 0.30 0.232 -1.206** 
(0.517) 
2411 3.71* 0.617 -1.197 
(0.730) 
2124 1.02 0.53 
Tier 2/rwaxCBDV 
 
-0.003 
(0.029) 
   -0.029 
(0.036) 
   -0.16 
(0.244) 
   -0.453* 
(0.254) 
   
Total capital/rwa 
xIBDV 
0.028** 
(0.012) 
4433 6.21** 0.199 0.042*** 
(0.012) 
3808 2.98* 0.238 0.416*** 
(0.059) 
3571 2.02 0.607 0.487*** 
(0.079) 
3061 3.16* 0.56 
Total capital/rwa 
xCBDV 
0.052*** 
(0.007) 
   0.059*** 
(0.009) 
   0.504*** 
(0.064) 
   0.617*** 
(0.065) 
   
Tier 1/ta xIBDV 
 
0.045* 
(0.026) 
3312 5.78** 0.223 0.067*** 
(0.022) 
2720 2.12 0.283 0.59*** 
(0.088) 
2466 8.55*** 0.635 0.644*** 
(0.148) 
2133 13.51*** 0.544 
Tier 1/ta xCBDV 
 
0.088*** 
(0.016) 
   0.092*** 
(0.017) 
   0.912*** 
(0.134) 
   1.146*** 
(0.146) 
   
Tier 2/ta xIBDV 
 
-0.085 
(0.123) 
3247 1.81 0.177 0.069 
(0.143) 
2658 0.00 0.227 -0.751 
(0.817) 
2405 1.59 0.605 -1.127 
(1.016) 
2080 0.78 0.501 
Tier 2/ta xCBDV 
 
0.076** 
(0.036) 
   0.07* 
(0.041) 
   0.271 
(0.369) 
   -0.243 
(0.360) 
   
Total capital/ta xIBDV 
 
0.044* 
(0.0256) 
3513 5.34** 0.218 0.067*** 
(0.022) 
2915 2.50 0.273 0.606*** 
(0.092) 
2662 9.98*** 0.637 0.648*** 
(0.143) 
2290 10.89*** 0.55 
Total capital/ta 
xCBDV 
0.083*** 
(0.015) 
   0.092*** 
(0.016) 
   0.911*** 
(0.120) 
   1.047*** 
(0.129) 
   
Common equity/ta 
xIBDV 
0.043*** 
(0.022) 
7203 3.56* 0.181 0.061*** 
(0.011) 
6302 1.32 0.218 0.573*** 
(0.057) 
6043 1.62 0.544 0.653*** 
(0.075) 
4780 1.61 0.524 
Common equity/ta 
xCBDV 
0.065*** 
(0.006) 
   0.073*** 
(0.008) 
   0.655*** 
(0.062) 
   0.752*** 
(0.058) 
   
Tangible equity/ta 
xIBDV 
0.046*** 
(0.012) 
7203 4.15** 0.187 0.062*** 
(0.011) 
6302 1.87 0.224 0.572*** 
(0.057) 
6043 2.33 0.545 0.656*** 
(0.074) 
4780 1.77 0.525 
Tangible equity/ta 
xCBDV 
0.069*** 
(0.007) 
   0.077*** 
(0.008) 
   0.669*** 
(0.063) 
   0.758*** 
(0.058) 
   
Notes: PROF1 is the ratio of net income to three year average assets. PROF2 is the ratio of operating profit to three year average assets. EFF1 is a basic gross efficiency score 
model in which we do not control for the risk in bank inputs. EFF2 is a basic gross efficiency score model in which we introduce loan loss provisions to control for risk in 
bank inputs. The estimations are based on OLS regressions with country and year fixed effects. For expositional brevity, we only report the coefficient estimates of the 
interactions terms between the Islamic bank dummy variable (IBDV), the conventional bank dummy variable (CBDV), and different proxies of capital ratios. Standard errors 
are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table 3  
Capital, bank size, and too big to fail banks 
Panel A: size 
Variables PROF1 PROF2 EFF1 EFF2 
 Coef.  N F-test  R2 Coef. N F-test R2 Coef. N F-test R2 Coef. N F-test R2 
Tier 1/rwaxIBDV 
 
0.158 
(0.103) 
3261 10.38*** 0.221 0.275*** 
(0.104) 
2685 4.25** 0.27 0.009 
(0.006) 
2456 2.59 0.555 0.021*** 
(0.007) 
2149 7.81*** 0.508 
Tier 1/rwaxCBDV 
 
0.388*** 
(0.069) 
   0.428*** 
(0.08) 
   0.019*** 
(0.006) 
   0.039*** 
(0.006) 
   
Tier 2/rwaxIBDV 
 
-0.237 
-0.473) 
3218 0.39 0.184 0.05 
(0.524) 
2640 0.13 0.23 -0.075** 
(0.035) 
2411 15.44*** 0.561 -0.082* 
(0.049) 
2124 5.34 0.491 
Tier 2/rwaxCBDV 
 
0.042 
(0.179) 
   -0.131 
(0.2116) 
   0.07*** 
(0.019) 
   0.031 
(0.019) 
   
Total capital/rwa 
xIBDV 
0.199** 
(0.087) 
4433 7.47*** 0.196 0.309*** 
(0.088) 
3808 3.72* 0.237 0.017*** 
(0.005) 
3571 5.46** 0.535 0.025*** 
(0.006) 
3061 7.25*** 0.518 
Total capital/rwa 
xCBDV 
0.377*** 
(0.053) 
   0.439*** 
(0.065) 
   0.028*** 
(0.005) 
   0.039*** 
(0.005) 
   
Tier 1/ta xIBDV 
 
0.239 
(0.177) 
3312 6.06** 0.211 0.396** 
(0.158) 
2720 1.96 0.268 0.009 
(0.007) 
2466 1.71 0.528 0.018* 
(0.010) 
2123 8.96*** 0.476 
Tier 1/ta xCBDV 
 
0.537*** 
(0.108) 
   0.562*** 
(0.115) 
   0.021** 
(0.010) 
   0.047*** 
(0.010) 
   
Tier 2/ta xIBDV 
 
-0.641 
(0.724) 
3247 2.46 0.175 0.211 
(0.822) 
2658 0.06 0.225 -0.074 
(0.054) 
2405 5.87** 0.528 -0.098 
(0.068) 
2080 2.74* 0.46 
Tier 2/ta xCBDV 
 
0.442* 
(0.243) 
   0.391 
(0.275) 
   0.056** 
(0.026) 
   0.013 
(0.024) 
   
Total capital/ta xIBDV 
 
0.249 
(0.173) 
3513 5.92** 0.207 0.406** 
(0.1566) 
2915 2.4 0.26 0.014* 
(0.007) 
2662 4.55** 0.536 0.021** 
(0.01) 
2290 8.86*** 0.483 
Total capital/ta 
xCBDV 
0.524*** 
(0.105) 
   0.577*** 
(0.108) 
   0.03*** 
(0.009) 
   0.047*** 
(0.009) 
   
Common equity/ta 
xIBDV 
0.298*** 
(0.094) 
7203 5.26** 0.18 0.43*** 
(0.084) 
6302 2.74* 0.218 0.024*** 
(0.005) 
6043 0.42 0.469 0.032*** 
(0.006) 
4780 1.47 0.471 
Common equity/ta 
xCBDV 
0.493*** 
(0.046) 
   0.564*** 
(0.057) 
   0.027*** 
(0.005) 
   0.039*** 
(0.005) 
   
Tangible equity/ta 
xIBDV 
0.317*** 
(0.093) 
7203 5.92** 0.186 0.443*** 
(0.083) 
6302 3.5* 0.224 0.024*** 
(0.004) 
6043 0.72 0.47 0.032*** 
(0.006) 
4780 1.61 0.472 
Tangible equity/ta 
xCBDV 
0.52*** 
(0.047) 
   0.59*** 
(0.057) 
   0.028*** 
(0.005) 
   0.04*** 
(0.005) 
   
Panel B: Too big to fail  
Variables PROF1 PROF2 EFF1 EFF2 
 Coef.  N F-test R2 Coef. N F-test R2 Coef. N F-test R2 Coef. N F-test R2 
Tier 1/rwaxIBDV 
 
0.024* 
(0.013) 
3261 0.03 0.191 0.025* 
(0.014) 
2685 0.19 0.236 0.396*** 
(0.119) 
2456 6.34 0.584 0.415*** 
(0.130) 
2149 3.32* 0.517 
Tier 1/rwaxCBDV 
 
0.022*** 
(0.008) 
   0.019** 
(0.009) 
   0.72*** 
(0.093) 
   0.667*** 
(0.0867) 
   
Tier 2/rwaxIBDV 
 
-0.029 
(0.073) 
3213 0.00 0.184 -0.017 
(0.072) 
2640 0.14 0.231 -0.548 
(0.566) 
2411 18.22*** 0.571 -0.692 
(0.940) 
2124 4.56** 0.498 
Tier 2/rwaxCBDV 
 
-0.027 
(0.026) 
   -0.04 
(0.029) 
   2.003*** 
(0.353) 
   1.34*** 
(0.341) 
   
Total capital/rwa 0.011 4433 0.18 0.153 0.013 3808 0.61 0.189 0.364*** 3571 6.22** 0.556 0.369*** 3061 2.53 0.518 
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xIBDV (0.011) (0.013) (0.109) (0.121) 
Total capital/rwa 
xCBDV 
0.007 
(0.006) 
   0.003 
(0.007) 
   0.646*** 
(0.072) 
   0.564*** 
(0.067) 
   
Tier 1/ta xIBDV 
 
0.027 
(0.018) 
3312 0.06 0.179 0.023 
(0.020) 
2720 0.19 0.231 0.551*** 
(0.146) 
2466 7.72*** 0.552 0.58*** 
(0.155) 
2123 5.12** 0.486 
Tier 1/ta xCBDV 
 
0.022* 
(0.013) 
   0.014 
(0.014) 
   0.996*** 
(0.142) 
   0.967*** 
(0.147) 
   
Tier 2/ta xIBDV 
 
-0.135 
(0.089) 
3247 1.23 0.172 -0.124 
(0.078) 
2658 0.85 0.225 -0.226 
(0.847) 
2405 8.48*** 0.537 -0.702 
(1.229) 
2080 3.53* 0.466 
Tier 2/ta xCBDV 
 
-0.037 
(0.036) 
   -0.055 
(0.039) 
   2.377*** 
(0.471) 
   1.621*** 
(0.482) 
   
Total capital/ta xIBDV 
 
0.016 
(0.016) 
3513 0.00 0.171 0.015 
(0.019) 
2915 0.04 0.216 0.526*** 
(0.139) 
2662 6.93*** 0.559 0.529*** 
(0.156) 
2290 3.97** 0.493 
Total capital/ta 
xCBDV 
0.016 
(0.011) 
   0.012 
(0.012) 
   0.923*** 
(0.115) 
   0.851*** 
(0.115) 
   
Common equity/ta 
xIBDV 
0.019 
(0.017) 
7203 0.10 0.124 0.017 
(0.016) 
6302 0.09 0.144 0.303** 
(0.132) 
6043 16.07*** 0.472 0.437*** 
(0.127) 
4780 6.51 0.46 
Common equity/ta 
xCBDV 
0.024** 
(0.009) 
   0.022* 
(0.012) 
   0.894*** 
(0.103) 
   0.808*** 
(0.107) 
   
Tangible equity/ta 
xIBDV 
0.02 
(0.017) 
7203 0.06 0.124 0.017 
(0.015) 
6302 0.07 0.144 0.292** 
(0.130) 
6043 15.87*** 0.472 0.442*** 
(0.127) 
4780 5.8** 0.46 
Tangible equity/ta 
xCBDV 
0.024*** 
(0.009) 
   0.021* 
(0.012) 
   0.869*** 
(0.101) 
   0.79*** 
(0.107) 
   
(Continued) 
Notes: PROF1 is the ratio of net income to three year average assets. PROF2 is the ratio of operating profit to three year average assets. EFF1 is a basic gross efficiency score model in 
which we do not control for the risk in bank inputs. EFF2 is a basic gross efficiency score model in which we introduce loan loss provisions to control for risk in bank inputs. The estimations 
are based on OLS regressions with country and year fixed effects. For expositional brevity, we only report the coefficient estimates of the interactions terms between the Islamic bank dummy 
variable (IBDV), the conventional bank dummy variable (CBDV), and different proxies of capital ratios. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below 
their coefficient estimates.   
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.  
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Table 4 
Highly capitalized banks 
Variables PROF1 PROF2  EFF1 EFF2 
 Coef.  N F-test R2 Coef.  N F-test R2 Coef.  N F-test R2 Coef.  N F-test R2 
Panel A: Adequately capitalized banks: Tier1= 4%; CAR=8% 
Tier 1/rwaxIBDV 
 
0.025 
(0.017) 
3261 6.66** 0.226 0.041** 
(0.016) 
2685 2.32 0.274 0.392*** 
(0.077) 
2456 1.73 0.632 0.49*** 
(0.102) 
2149 6.18** 0.563 
Tier 1/rwaxCBDV 
 
0.059*** 
(0.01) 
   0.062*** 
(0.011) 
   0.514*** 
(0.084) 
   0.753*** 
(0.083) 
   
Total capital/rwa 
xIBDV 
0.026* 
(0.015) 
4433 4.23** 0.197 0.039*** 
(0.014) 
3808 2.41 0.238 0.396*** 
(0.063) 
3571 2.26 0.607 0.446*** 
(0.088) 
3061 4.06** 0.56 
Total capital/rwa 
xCBDV 
0.053*** 
(0.007) 
   0.06*** 
(0.009) 
   0.513*** 
(0.067) 
   0.634*** 
(0.067) 
   
Panel B: Well capitalized banks:Tier1= 6%; CAR=10% 
Tier 1/rwaxIBDV 
 
0.024 
(0.017) 
3261 6.05** 0.226 0.04** 
(0.017) 
2685 2.22 0.274 0.388*** 
(0.079) 
2456 1.69 0.632 0.474*** 
(0.105) 
2149 6.53** 0.563 
Tier 1/rwaxCBDV 
 
0.06*** 
(0.009) 
   0.062*** 
(0.011) 
   0.517*** 
(0.086) 
   0.763*** 
(0.085) 
   
Total capital/rwa 
xIBDV 
0.026* 
(0.015) 
4433 3.68* 0.197 0.039*** 
(0.014) 
3808 2.24 0.238 0.39*** 
(0.064) 
3571 2.31 0.607 0.433*** 
(0.090) 
3061 4.32** 0.56 
Total capital/rwa 
xCBDV 
0.054*** 
(0.007) 
   0.06*** 
(0.009) 
   0.516*** 
(0.068) 
   0.639*** 
(0.068) 
   
Panel C: Highly capitalized banks  
Tier 1/rwaxIBDV 
 
0.1 
(0404) 
3261 1.303* 0.207 0.623* 
(0.364) 
2685 0.37 0.252 8.591*** 
(3.101) 
2456 0.12 0.623 10.909*** 
(3.127) 
2149 0.02 0.549 
Tier 1/rwaxCBDV 
 
0.85*** 
(0.131) 
   0.857*** 
(0.160) 
   7.389*** 
(1.443) 
   11.362*** 
(1.525) 
   
Total capital/rwa 
xIBDV 
0.287 
(0.479) 
4433 1.71 0.178 0.841* 
(0.449) 
3808 0.26 0.218 10.207*** 
(3.074) 
3571 0.24 0.594 12.08*** 
(3.102) 
3061 0.00 0.55 
Total capital/rwa 
xCBDV 
0.938*** 
(0.128) 
   1.081*** 
(0.173) 
   8.606*** 
(1.409) 
   11.9*** 
(1.396) 
   
Notes: PROF1 is the ratio of net income to three year average assets. PROF2 is the ratio of operating profit to three year average assets. EFF1 is a basic gross efficiency score 
model in which we do not control for the risk in bank inputs. EFF2 is a basic gross efficiency score model in which we introduce loan loss provisions to control for risk in bank 
inputs. The estimations are based on OLS regressions with country and year fixed effects. For expositional brevity, we only report the coefficient estimates of the interactions 
terms between the Islamic bank dummy variable (IBDV), the conventional bank dummy variable (CBDV), and different proxies of capital ratios. Standard errors are clustered at 
the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 5  
One year lag – controlling for possible endogeneity 
Variables PROF1 PROF2 EFF1 EFF2 
 Coef.  N F-test R2 Coef.  N F-test R2 Coef.  N F-test R2 Coef.  N F-test R2 
Tier 1/rwa(-1)xIBDV 
 
0.017 
(0.017) 
2517 4.56** 0.252 0.038*** 
(0.016) 
2312 1.18 0.271 0.339*** 
(0.076) 
2100 2.4 0.619 0.486*** 
(0.093) 
1854 9.17*** 0.543 
Tier 1/rwa(-1)xCBDV 
 
0.045*** 
(0.045) 
   0.05*** 
(0.010) 
   0.465*** 
(0.079) 
   0.753*** 
(0.087) 
   
Tier 2/rwa(-1)xIBDV 
 
0.025 
(0.057) 
2778 0.00 0.193 0.057 
(0.092) 
2276 1.04 0.242 -0.041 
(0.578) 
2064 0.00 0.608 -0.294 
(0.784) 
1833 0.03 0.502 
Tier 2/rwa(-1)xCBDV 
 
0.028 
(0.029) 
   -0.034 
(0.035) 
   -0.004 
(0.260) 
   -0.155 
(0.283) 
   
Total capital/rwa(-1) 
xIBDV 
0.023 
(0.015) 
3835 2.69 0.199 0.037*** 
(0.014) 
3288 1.38 0.247 0.34*** 
(0.063) 
3066 3.3* 0.594 0.469*** 
(0.081) 
2649 4.64** 0.549 
Total capital/rwa(-1) 
xCBDV 
0.042*** 
(0.007) 
   0.05*** 
(0.008) 
   0.457*** 
(0.067) 
   0.624*** 
(0.067) 
   
Tier 1/ta(-1) xIBDV 
 
0.029 
(0.034) 
2804 1.99 0.205 0.062** 
(0.028) 
2285 0.43 0.279 0.493*** 
(0.113) 
2049 6.62** 0.599 0.6*** 
(0.159) 
1783 13.19*** 0.525 
Tier 1/ta(-1) xCBDV 
 
0.061*** 
(0.018) 
   0.075*** 
(0.017) 
   0.804*** 
(0.141) 
   1.118*** 
(0.159) 
   
Tier 2/ta (-1)xIBDV 
 
-0.01 
(0.149) 
2747 0.44 0.179 0.132 
(0.154) 
2230 0.26 0.236 0.768 
(0.869) 
1996 0.46 0.578 0.258 
(1.129) 
1746 0.07 0.485 
Tier 2/ta(-1) xCBDV 
 
0.084** 
(0.041) 
   0.06 
(0.044) 
   0.182 
(0.433) 
   -0.048 
(0.341) 
   
Total capital/ta(-1) 
xIBDV 
0.03 
(0.033) 
2981 2.44 0.206 0.06** 
(0.027) 
2456 0.86 0.273 0.53*** 
(0.109) 
2220 8.45*** 0.607 0.593*** 
(0.148) 
1933 12.0*** 0.531 
Total capital/ta(-1) 
xCBDV 
0.063*** 
(0.017) 
   0.077*** 
(0.016) 
   0.848*** 
(0.134) 
   1.03*** 
(0.135) 
   
Common equity/ta(-1) 
xIBDV 
0.03* 
(0.016) 
6211 1.67 0.167 0.051*** 
(0.013) 
5423 0.49 0.218 0.527*** 
(0.065) 
5165 2.73* 0.529 0.593*** 
(0.0756) 
4121 3.23* 0.511 
Common equity/ta(-1) 
xCBDV 
0.048*** 
(0.006) 
   0.06*** 
(0.008) 
   0.646*** 
(0.067) 
   0.736*** 
(0.058) 
   
Tangible equity/ta(-1) 
xIBDV 
0.032** 
(0.015) 
6211 1.97 0.171 0.053*** 
(0.013) 
5423 0.67 0.221 0.531*** 
(0.065) 
5165 3.42* 0.529 0.598*** 
(0.075) 
4121 3.14* 0.511 
Tangible equity/ta(-1) 
xCBDV 
0.051*** 
(0.007) 
   0.063*** 
(0.008) 
   0.661*** 
(0.068) 
   0.736*** 
(0.059) 
   
Notes: PROF1 is the ratio of net income to three year average assets. PROF2 is the ratio of operating profit to three year average assets. EFF1 is a basic gross efficiency score model 
in which we do not control for the risk in bank inputs. EFF2 is a basic gross efficiency score model in which we introduce loan loss provisions to control for risk in bank inputs. The 
estimations are based on OLS regressions with country and year fixed effects. For expositional brevity, we only report the coefficient estimates of the interactions terms between the 
Islamic bank dummy variable (IBDV), the conventional bank dummy variable (CBDV), and different proxies of capital ratios. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are 
reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 6  
Other estimation techniques 
Panel A: Truncated regressions approach 
Variables PROF1 PROF2 EFF1 ∆ EFF2 
 Coef.  N F-test  Coef. N F-test Coef. N F-test Coef. N F-test 
Tier 1/rwa x IBDV (β1)  0.033** 
(0.015) 
3261 3.87** 0.039*** 
(0.014) 
2685 1.27 0.567*** 
(0.074) 
2456 0.03 0.717*** 
(0.103) 
2149 1.59 
Tier 1/rwa x CBDV (β2) 0.056*** 
(0.009) 
  0.051*** 
(0.011) 
  0.582*** 
(0.088) 
  0.848*** 
(0.089) 
  
Tier 2/rwa x IBDV (β1) -0.076 
(0.080) 
3213 0.01 -0.006 
(0.087) 
2640 0.99 -0.131 
(0.572) 
2411 0.07 -0.499 
(0.888) 
2124 0.1 
Tier 2/rwa x CBDV (β2) -0.077** 
(0.031) 
  -0.093** 
(0.038) 
  0.034 
(0.273) 
  -0.209 
(0.283) 
  
Total capital/rwa x IBDV (β1) 0.031** 
(0.012) 
4433 1.91 0.038*** 
(0.012) 
3808 0.62 0.543*** 
(0.059) 
3571 0.28 0.657*** 
(0.082) 
3061 0.4 
Total capital/rwa x CBDV (β2) 0.044*** 
(0.007) 
  0.046*** 
(0.009) 
  0.577*** 
(0.066) 
  0.707*** 
(0.071) 
  
Tier 1/ta x IBDV (β1) 0.0461* 
(0.0239) 
3312 3.72* 0.059*** 
(0.020) 
2720 1.37 0.703*** 
(0.079) 
2466 5.04** 0.813*** 
(0.129) 
2123 7.93*** 
Tier 1/ta x CBDV (β2) 0.082*** 
(0.015) 
  0.081*** 
(0.017) 
  0.968*** 
(0.141) 
  1.228*** 
(0.159) 
  
Tier 2/ta x IBDV (β1) -0.061 
(0.127) 
3247 0.19 0.134 
(0.137) 
2658 1.23 0.732 
(0.858) 
2405 0.01 0.037 
(1.207) 
2080 0.03 
Tier 2/ta x CBDV (β2) -0.007 
(0.037) 
  -0.013 
(0.044) 
  0.787* 
(0.427) 
  0.260 
(0.491) 
  
Total capital/ta  xIBDV (β1) 0.042* 
(0.023) 
3513 3.65* 0.056*** 
(0.019) 
2915 1.57 0.728*** 
(0.079) 
2662 8.66** 0.793*** 
(0.120) 
2290 8.59*** 
Total capital/ta x CBDV (β2) 0.075*** 
(0.013) 
  0.077*** 
(0.016) 
  1.023*** 
(0.123) 
  1.16*** 
(0.133) 
  
Common equity/ta x IBDV (β1) 0.047*** 
(0.013) 
7203 0.49 0.058*** 
(0.011) 
6302 0.03 0.672*** 
(0.051) 
6043 0.69 0.793*** 
(0.069) 
4780 0.55 
Common equity/ta x CBDV (β2) 0.055*** 
(0.007) 
  0.06*** 
(0.008) 
  0.724*** 
(0.055) 
  0.848*** 
(0.057) 
  
Tangible equity/ta x IBDV (β1) 0.048*** 
(0.013) 
7203 0.74 0.059*** 
(0.011) 
6302 0.15 0.662*** 
(0.050) 
6043 1.3 0.784*** 
(0.068) 
4780 0.72 
Tangible equity/ta x CBDV (β2) 0.058*** 
(0.007) 
  0.063*** 
(0.008) 
  0.732*** 
(0.056) 
  0.846*** 
(0.057) 
  
Panel B: First difference estimation  
Variables ∆ PROF1 ∆ PROF2 ∆ EFF1 ∆ EFF2 
 Coef.  N F-test R2 Coef.  N F-test R2 Coef.  N F-test R2 Coef.  N F-test R2 
∆ Tier 1/rwaxIBDV (β1) 
 
0.072** 
(0.036) 
2618 0.07 0.079 0.038 
(0.026) 
2076 0.32 0.119 0.078 
(0.178) 
1925 0.01 0.292 0.307 
(0.259) 
1731 1.7 0.423 
∆ Tier 1/rwaxCBDV (β2) 
 
0.063*** 
(0.011) 
   0.054*** 
(0.013) 
   0.086 
(0.092) 
   -0.062 
(0.121) 
   
∆ Tier 2/rwaxIBDV (β1) 
 
-0.068 
(0.115) 
2580 0.07 0.054 -0.088 
(0.070) 
2043 1.15 0.102 -1.835** 
(0.851) 
1892 3.76* 0.292 -2.224*** 
(0.738) 
1714 5.51** 0.427 
∆ Tier 2/rwaxCBDV 
(β2) 
-0.037 
(0.050) 
   -0.001 
(0.045) 
   -0.109 
(0.264) 
   -0.34 
(0.319) 
   
∆ Total capital/rwa 
xIBDV (β1) 
0.062* 
(0.032) 
3636 0.08 0.061 0.039* 
(0.022) 
3048 0.57 0.096 0.091 
(0.170) 
2876 0.07 0.28 0.336 
(0.229) 
2533 1.7 0.427 
31 
 
∆ Total capital/rwa 
xCBDV (β2) 
0.052*** 
(0.009) 
   0.057*** 
(0.011) 
   0.042 
(0.062) 
   0.027 
(0.078) 
   
∆ Tier 1/ta xIBDV (β1) 
 
0.201** 
(0.080) 
2666 0.19 0.091 0.126** 
(0.050) 
2107 0.29 0.124 0.400 
(0.307) 
1927 0.01 0.277 0.652** 
(0.316) 
1703 2.55 0.389 
∆ Tier 1/ta xCBDV (β2) 
 
0.165*** 
(0.037) 
   0.159*** 
(0.040) 
   0.405** 
(0.163) 
   0.048 
(0.223) 
   
∆ Tier 2/ta xIBDV (β1) 
 
-0.269 
(0.191) 
2612 2.6 0.043 -0.215** 
(0.084) 
2058 7.31*** 0.08 -1.716 
(1.221) 
1878 1.71 0.273 -3.727*** 
(0.906) 
1669 11.32*** 0.395 
∆ Tier 2/ta xCBDV (β2) 
 
0.048 
(0.051) 
   0.052 
(0.055) 
   -0.03 
(0.402) 
   -0.395 
(0.444) 
   
∆ Total capital/ta xIBDV 
(β1) 
0.053 
(0.046) 
2845 2.09 0.067 0.027 
(0.032) 
2282 5.08** 0.10 0.0765 
(0.136) 
2100 1.73 0.264 0.084 
(0.125) 
1854 0.08 0.379 
∆ Total capital/ta 
xCBDV (β2) 
0.129*** 
(0.030) 
   0.127*** 
(0.033) 
   0.339** 
(0.147) 
   0.021 
(0.183) 
   
∆ Common equity/ta 
xIBDV (β1) 
0.099*** 
(0.031) 
6143 0.08 0.073 0.074*** 
(0.025) 
5276 1.16 0.081 0.835*** 
(0.157) 
5059 5.65** 0.268 0.185 
(0.202) 
4016 0.15 0.382 
∆ Common equity/ta 
xCBDV (β2) 
0.109*** 
(0.014) 
   0.104*** 
(0.015) 
   0.426*** 
(0.090) 
   0.097 
(0.106) 
   
∆ Tangible equity/ta 
xIBDV (β1) 
0.105*** 
(0.033) 
6143 0.44 0.084 0.077*** 
(0.026) 
5276 3.23* 0.094 0.82*** 
(0.127) 
5059 4.42** 0.27 0.142 
(0.204) 
4106 0.02 0.382 
∆ Tangible equity/ta 
xCBDV (β2) 
0.127*** 
(0.014) 
   0.128*** 
(0.015) 
   0.503*** 
(0.097) 
   0.174* 
(0.0999) 
   
(Continued) 
Notes: PROF1 is the ratio of net income to three year average assets. PROF2 is the ratio of operating profit to three year average assets. EFF1 is a basic gross efficiency score model 
in which we do not control for the risk in bank inputs. EFF2 is a basic gross efficiency score model in which we introduce loan loss provisions to control for risk in bank inputs. The 
estimations in Panel A are based on a truncated regression technique proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007). Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust, clustered at the bank level, 
and reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates. The estimations in Panel B are based on a first difference regression. ∆ indicates the first-difference of a variable between 
two consecutive years. All models include country and year fixed effects. For expositional brevity, we only report the coefficient estimates of the interactions terms between the 
Islamic bank dummy variable (IBDV), the conventional bank dummy variable (CBDV), and different proxies of capital ratios.  Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and 
reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.  
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Fig. 1. Quantile plots for the profitability measure (PROF1) 
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Fig. 2. Quantile plots for the efficiency measure (EFF1) 
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